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1 Introduction
The concept of k-anonymity, used in the recent literature (e.g., [10, 11, 7, 5, 1]) to
formally evaluate the privacy preservation of published tables, was introduced
in the seminal papers of Samarati and Sweeney [10, 11] based on the notion
of quasi-identifiers (or QI for short). The process of obtaining k-anonymity
for a given private table is first to recognize the QIs in the table, and then
to anonymize the QI values, the latter being called k-anonymization. While
k-anonymization is usually rigorously validated by the authors, the definition
of QI remains mostly informal, and different authors seem to have different
interpretations of the concept of QI.
The purpose of this short note is to provide a formal underpinning of QI
and examine the correctness and incorrectness of various interpretations of QI
in our formal framework. We observe that in cases where the concept has been
used correctly, its application has been conservative; this note provides a formal
understanding of the conservative nature in such cases.
The notion of QI was perhaps first introduced by Dalenius in [3] to denote a
set of attribute values in census records that may be used to re-identify a single
or a group of individuals. To Dalenius, the case of multiple individuals being
identified is potentially dangerous because of collusion. In [10, 11], the notion
of QI is extended to a set of attributes whose (combined) values may be used
to re-identify the individuals of the released information by using “external”
sources. Hence, the appearance of QI attribute values in a published database
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table may give out private information and must be carefully controlled. One
way to achieve this control is by anonymizing QI attribute values, through a
k-anonymization process.
The k-anonymization process, as first defined in [10, 11], amounts to gener-
alizing the values of the QI in the table so that the set of individuals, who have
the same generalized QI attribute value combination, forms an anonymity set of
size no less than k, following the pioneering work on anonymity set by Chaum
[2]. (According to a later proposal for terminology [9], “Anonymity is the state
of being identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.”) The resulting
table is said to be k-anonymous.
The notion of QI is hence fundamental for k-anonymity. However, in [10],
QI is only informally described. The paper seems to assume that all attributes
that may be available from external sources should be part of QI. Recent papers
(e.g., [7, 1]) appear to use a similar informal definition, but with a variety of
interpretations (see below).
The only formal definition of QI that we found in the literature appears in
[11]. The definition is rather complicated, but from that definition, we under-
stand that a set of attributes QT in a table T is a QI if there exists a specific
individual ri, such that, only based on the combination of the values for QT
associated with ri, it is possible to re-identify that specific, single individual.
From the above formal definition emerges that what really characterizes a
QI is the ability to associate a combination of its values with a single individ-
ual. The same notion seems to be captured by Def. 2.1 of [6]. We shall call
the QI defined this way 1-QI (the number 1 intuitively indicates the number of
individuals identified by the QI). This formal definition seems to deviate from
the original idea of Dalenius [3] which gave importance to the identification of
groups of individuals. Although Dalenius was only concerned about collusion,
the identification of groups of individuals is closely related to the anonymity set
concept and should not be ignored. This deviation actually leads to incorrect-
ness as we shall show in this short note.
Many studies on k-anonymization have since appeared in the literature.
However, different authors seem to interpret the concept of QI differently. In
addition to the original interpretation of QI as (1) the set of all the attributes
that appear in external sources [10], and (2) a set of attributes that we call 1-QI
[11], we found the following use of QI in k-anonymization: (3) use the minimum
QI, i.e., the minimum set of attributes that can be used to re-identify individu-
als [5, 4], and (4) anonymize the multiple minimum QIs in the same table [12]
since the minimum QI is found not unique.
Through a formal study of the notion of QI, we conclude in this short note
that the use of QI as in category (1) is correct but conservative, while the use of
QI as in the other three categories is incorrect. Hence, the contribution of this
short note is: (a) the concept of QI and its role in k-anonymity are clarified,
and (b) the conservative nature of the techniques in the recent papers is better
understood. Point (b) above can further lead to (c) new possibilities for more
focused data anonymization to avoid over conservativeness.
The remainder of this short paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives
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some preliminary definitions. Section 3 introduces a new formalization of k-
anonymity, and Section 4 defines the notion of QIs and links the QI with k-
anonymity. Section 5 shows k-anonymity using QI other than all the external
attributes is problematic, and Section 6 formalizes in our framework the con-
servative assumption currently used for k-anonymization and provides a proof
that the approach is sufficient but not necessary. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminary definitions
Following the convention of the k-anonymity literature, we assume a relational
model with the bag semantics (or multiset semantics). We assume the standard
bag-semantic definitions of database relation/table, attribute and tuple, as well
as the standard bag-semantic definitions of the relational algebra operations.
In particular, under the bag semantics, relations allow duplicate tuples and
operations keep duplicates [8].
We shall use T (possibly with subscripts) to denote relational tables, t (pos-
sibly with subscripts) to denote tuples in tables, and Attr[T ] to denote the
attribute set of table T . We shall also use A and B (possibly with subscripts)
to denote both sets of attributes and single attributes as the difference will be
clear from the context.
To prevent private information from leaking, the k-anonymization approach
is to generalize the values in a table. For example, both ZIP codes “22033”
and “22035” may be generalized to the value “2203*”, an interval value [22000–
22099], or a general concept value “Fairfax, Virginia”. The idea is that each
“generalized” value corresponds to a set of “specific” values, and the user of the
table can only tell from the general value that the original value is one of the
specific values in the set.
The set of specific values that corresponds to a general value can be formally
specified with a decoding function. This decoding function, denoted Dec(),
maps a value to a non-empty set of values. The domain of Dec() is said to be
the general values, denotedDG, and the range ofDec() is the non-empty subsets
of the specific values, denoted DS . As such, all attributes in our relational tables
will use the same domain, either DG (for generalized tables) or DS (for specific
tables). We assume that DS is a subset of DG and decoding of a DS value is
the set consisting of the value itself. In addition, we assume that the decoding
function is publicly known and hence all the privacy protection is from the
uncertainty provided by the set of values decoded from a single one.
The decoding function is trivially extended to tuples, by decoding each of the
attribute values in a tuple. More specifically, given a tuple t with generalized
values on attributes A1, . . . , An, Dec(t) gives the set of tuples Dec(t[A1]) ×
· · · × Dec(t[An]), i.e., the cross product of the decoding of each attribute. In
other words, the decoding of a tuple t gives rise to the set of all specific tuples
that would be generalized to t. The decoding function is similarly extended to
tables, yielding a set Dec(T ) of tables from a given T . Specifically, given a table
T = t1, . . . , tn, a table T
′ = t′1, . . . , t
′
n is in Dec(T ) if t
′
i is in Dec(ti) for each
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i = 1, . . . , n.
In the k-anonymization literature, tables may be generalized using a local
encoding or global encoding [5]. (Encoding refers to the process of obtaining the
general value from a specific one.) The difference is that in global encoding, the
different appearances of a specific value are generalized to the same generalized
value, while in local encoding, they may be generalized to different generalized
values. The formalization with Dec() function is oblivious to this difference,
and is correct in the sense that with either approach, the original table is in
Dec(T ). The Dec() approach is justified as we are not concerned in this short
note with specific anonymization techniques.
3 The world and k-anonymity
In this section, we formally define the notion of k-anonymity without using
QIs. We will introduce the QI concept in the next section. The approach is
in contrast to defining k-anonymity based on the concept of QI as traditionally
done. We note that our approach is a logical one since only when we can define
k-anonymity independently of QI, we may prove the correctness of a particular
definition of QI.
The world
To start with, we model all the external sources that can be used to re-identify
individuals as a world. A worldW conceptually is a blackbox that uses attribute
values for re-identification. That is, given a tuple t on some of the attributes
of W , the world W will give back the set of individuals that have the attribute
values given by t. Formally,
Definition 1. A world W is a pair (Attr[W ], ReIDW ), where Attr[W ] is a set
of attributes, and ReIDW is a function that maps the tuples on the schemas that
are non-empty subsets of Attr[W ], with domain values from DS, to the finite
sets of individuals.
In other words, given a relation schema R ⊆ Attr[W ] and a tuple t on R with
values fromDS , ReIDW (t) gives the set of individuals that possess the attribute
values given in t. We say that an individual in ReIDW (t) is an individual re-
identified with t by W , or simply re-identified with t when W is understood. In
this case, we may also say that tuple t re-identifies the individual.
Since the ReIDW function re-identifies individuals with their attribute val-
ues, one property we call “supertuple inclusion” should hold. For example, if
a person is in the set P of individuals re-identified with ZIP code 22032 to-
gether with gender male, then this person should be in the set P ′ re-identified
with ZIP code 22032 alone, i.e., P ⊆ P ′. On the other hand, if a person is in
P ′, then there must be a value of gender (either male or female) so that the
person must be re-identified with ZIP code 22032 and gender male (or female)
together. More generally, supertuple inclusion property means that if we add
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more attributes to a tuple t resulting in a “supertuple”, then the set of indi-
viduals re-identified will be a subset of those identified with t, and at the same
time, each individual re-identified with t will be re-identified with a particular
supertuple of t. Formally, we have:
Definition 2. A world W = (Attr[W ], ReIDW ) is said to satisfy the super-
tuple inclusion property if for each tuple t on attribute set A ⊆ Attr[W ] and
each attribute set B, with A ⊆ B ⊆ Attr[W ], there exist a finite number of
tuples t1, . . . , tq on B such that (1) ti[A] = t[A] for each i = 1, . . . , q, and
(2) ReIDW (t) = ReIDW (t1) ∪ · · · ∪ReIDW (tq).
In the sequel, we shall assume all the worlds satisfy the supertuple inclusion
property.
We also assume that, in the sequel, each world we consider is a closed world,
in which all the relevant individuals are included. That is, the set of individuals
identified by ReIDW (t) consists of all the individuals who have the attribute
values given by t. We shall further motivate this assumption at the the end of
this section.
A world is called a finite world if ReIDW maps only a finite number of tuples
to non-empty sets. In the sequel, we assume all worlds are finite worlds.
In summary, we assume in the sequel all the worlds (1) satisfy the supertuple
inclusion property, (2) are closed, and (3) are finite.
The function ReIDW in a world W is naturally extended to a set of tuples.
The above conceptual, blackbox worlds may be concretely represented as
finite relations. In particular, a world W = (Attr[W ], ReIDW ) can be repre-
sented as a relation W on Attr[W ] with domain DS , having the condition that
W includes attributes, such as SSN, that directly point to an individual. In
this case, function ReIDW will simply be a selection followed by a projection.
For example, if SSN is the attribute to identify individuals, then ReIDW (t) is
defined as piSSNσR=t(W ), where R is the schema for tuple t.
In this relational view of W , table W may be considered as a universal
relation storing for each individual all the associated data that are publicly
known. As in previous work on this topic, for the sake of simplicity, we also
assume that the information of one individual is contained in at most one tuple
of W . (We will explain in Section 7 how this assumption can be avoided.) We
also assume that one tuple of W contains information of only one individual.
Furthermore, we assume there is a public method that links a tuple of W with
the individual that the tuple corresponds to. This public method may be as
simple as an attribute, such as the social security number, in W that directly
points to a particular individual.
For example,W may contain the attributes SSN, Name, Birth Date, Gender,
Address, Voting record, etc. Each tuple of W corresponds to one individual
pointed by the SSN. Other attributes give the other property values of the
individual.
Note that the supertuple inclusion property is automatically satisfied by any
relational world.
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k-anonymity
In our environment, to provide privacy in a published table is to avoid any
attacker from using the world W to re-identify the individuals in the published
table. The k-anonymity is stronger, namely, it avoids any attacker from using
the world W to re-identify the individual to be among less than k individuals.
This intuition is captured more formally in Definition 4 below.
In order to simplify notation, in the following we use PAttr[T ] to denote the
public attributes of T , formally defined as Attr[W ]∩Attr[T ] when the worldW
is understood.
In the above discussion, the case of 0 individuals re-identified is a special
case. This is the case when a tuple piPAttr[T ](T ) does not re-identify anyone by
W , it would actually be a mistake since T is supposed to represent information
of some individuals and the world is assumed to be closed. If this 0 individuals
case happens, it must mean that the closed world we have is not “consistent”
with the table in our hand. This observation leads to the following:
Definition 3. Given a table T , a world W is said to be consistent with T if
|
⋃
t′∈Dec(t) ReIDW (t
′)| > 0 for each tuple t in piPAttr[T ](T ).
A consistent world for a table T is one that can re-identify all the indi-
viduals whose information is represented in T . In the sequel, we assume the
world is consistent with the tables under discussion. We provide motivation
for this assumption at the end of this section when we discuss the closed world
assumption.
We are now ready to define k-anonymity.
Definition 4. Let k ≥ 2 be an integer, W a world, and T a table with PAttr[T ] 6=
∅. Then T is said to be k-anonymous with respect to W if for each tuple t in
piPAttr[T ](T ), we have |
⋃
t′∈Dec(t) ReIDW (t
′)| ≥ k.
In the above definition, the Dec() function is implicitly assumed as public
knowledge, and
⋃
is the set union that removes duplicates. Intuitively, the
definition says that T is k-anonymous if for each tuple t in piPAttr[T ](T ), we can
find at least k individuals fromW having values for attributes PAttr[T ] as given
by Dec(t).
We note that since external information is considered for re-identification,
k-anonymity should be formally defined with respect to that information, and
not simply on the original private table (which may be conservatively considered
as a special case, as explained in Section 6), as done in most previous work.
As an example, assume the table in Figure 1(a) is the world, in which the
ID attribute is one that directly connects to actual individuals. Table T in
Figure 1(b) is 2-anonymous since each tuple (giving either 20032 or 20033 as
the zip code value) will re-identify two individuals through W . For table T ′,
the decoding function will map name J* to the set of all names that start with
J. Hence, the first and the second tuples of T ′ will re-identify four individuals
while the third tuple of T ′ will re-identify two individuals. Therefore, table T ′
is also 2-anonymous.
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ID FirstName ZIP
Id1 John 20033
Id2 Jeanne 20034
Id3 Jane 20033
Id4 Jane 20034
(a) The world W .
ZIP Disease
20033 D1
20033 D2
20034 D3
(b) A table T .
FirstName Bonus
J* $10K
J* $100K
Jane $20K
(c) Another table T ′.
Figure 1: The world W and two published tables.
Anonymity and uncertainty
As mentioned earlier, the notion of k-anonymity provides protection by forming
an anonymity set of size k. This notion should not be confused with protection
using uncertainty in terms of private values. For example, for T ′ in Figure 1(c),
even if there is only one Bonus value for Jane (hence there is no uncertainty in
terms of private values), since there are two Jane’s in the world and attackers
will not be sure which Jane gets the bonus, we therefore obtain 2-anonymity
for Jane. Hence, uncertainty of private values is not a necessary condition for
protecting privacy.
However, in other situations, uncertainty is required. For example, take T
in Figure 1(b) and assume that the public knows that the first two tuples are
for two different individuals. (In most of the k-anonymity literature, different
tuples in T are assumed to be for different individuals.) Now if the second
tuple had disease D1 instead of D2, there would not be enough protection via
anonymity since there are only two individuals in ZIP 20033 in the world W .
Indeed, in that case, both individuals Id1 and Id3 would have the same disease.
The notions of l-diversity [6] and (α, k)-anonymity [13] are provided to solve
this problem.
Two observations arise from the example in the previous paragraph. Firstly,
if we do not assume that the public knows the two tuples are for two different
individuals, then there is no privacy leaking since there is no way of telling
if any of the two individual has the disease (it could be the same individual
diagnosed with the same disease twice). The second is that even if the public
knows that the two tuples are indeed for two different individuals, 2-anonymity
is still maintained for each tuple since there is no way of knowing which of the
two indivuals the tuple corresponds to. The privacy leaking is due to a lack of
uncertainty. The reader is referred to [14] for more discussion of uncertainty
and anonymity (called indistinguishability in [14]). In this short note, we limit
our discussion to k-anonymity.
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Practical considerations
As observed in [10, 11], in practice it is very difficult to check k-anonymity on
external sources, mainly due to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of knowing
the closed world W that represents the complete knowledge of the external
world. Indeed, it is not what we are proposing to do in this short note from an
algorithmic point of view. Instead, we use this formal definition to clarify the
role of quasi-identifiers, to give a precise semantics to k-anonymity, and to study
the conservative nature of generalization algorithms reported in the literature.
On the other hand, from a practical point of view, it is possible that some
global constraints exist on the world, and that they could be exploited by k-
anonymization algorithms. For example, if we know from census data that the
combination 〈ZIP, Gender〉 has always no less than 500 individuals, any table TS
with PAttr[TS ] ⊆ 〈ZIP, gender〉 is automatically k-anonymous for any k ≤ 500.
Further investigation of such a technique is beyond the scope of this short note.
More on the closed world assumption
The idea of the closed world assumption is that we define k-anonymity based
on the theoretically “complete” knowledge of the external world. However, it
seems to be common in the literature that anonymity is defined based on the
possible knowledge of the attackers. By definition, any knowledge an attacker
has may very well be a part of the complete knowledge of a closed world.
The question arises as whether we may define k-anonymity based on the
partial knowledge that an attacker has of the closed world. Two scenarios
may be considered. In the first scenario, the attacker does not know all the
individuals that a tuple can re-identify. That is, for example, given a ZIP code
22032, the attacker only knows a subset of the individuals who reside in the
area determined by this ZIP code. In this scenario, a tuple in piPAttr[T ](T )
may re-identify by the attacker a proper subset of the k people that can be re-
identified by using the closed world. We should not use such partial knowledge
for k-anonymity for two reasons. (1) The attacker will gain false information
in the sense that he/she thinks that the individual is among fewer than there
actually are. (2) If we needed to be concerned with the partial knowledge, then
we needed to be concerned with all possible partial knowledge. In a particular
partial knowledge, the attacker may always re-identify a single individual with
any tuple. Then we would not be able gain k-anonymity at all. Due to these
two reasons, we should remain in our closed world assumption for this scenario.
The other scenario is that the attacker either knows all the individuals that
can be re-identified with a tuple by the closed world, or he/she does not know
anyone. For example, given a ZIP code 22032, the attacker either know all the
individuals living in ZIP 22032, or he/she does not have any clue who might live
in the area. This scenario is easier to deal with by simply removing these tuples
in T for consideration. However, in order to be conservative, we probably do
not want to do that, and again we come back to the conclusion that we need
the closed world assumption.
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Finally, the fact that a world is closed does not necessary mean that it has
the complete knowledge of all the individuals of the whole universe and all
their attributes. We only need the closed world to have the complete knowledge
about the attributes and the individuals that T is concerned with. For example,
if T only has attributes A1, . . . , Aq and only concerns residents in the state of
Virginia, then the closed world will only need to have the complete knowledge
of these attributes and the Virginia residents.
4 Quasi-identifiers and k-anonymity
In order to understand the relationship between the notion of QI and k-anonymity
we formally define QI, or more precisely k-QI, where k ≥ 1 is an integer. We
then provide a sufficient and necessary condition for k-anonymity based on these
notions. Intuitively, a set of attributes is a k-QI of a world W if a certain com-
bination of values for these attributes can only be found in no more than k
individuals of W , i.e., if that combination identifies a group of no more than k
individuals.
Definition 5. Given a world W and positive integer k, an attribute set A ⊆
Attr[W ] is said to be a k-QI of W if there exists a tuple t on A such that
0 6= |ReIDW (t)| ≤ k.
For example, in the relational world W in Figure 1(a), ZIP is a 2-QI, First-
Name is a 1-QI, and 〈FirstName, ZIP〉 combination is a 1-QI.
Clearly, each set of attributes A ⊆ Attr[W ] is a k-QI for some k for a given
finite world W .
Note that the notion of QI formalized in [11] and informally defined in other
works is captured by our definition of 1-QI. Indeed, assume some values of
QI uniquely identify individuals using external information. That is, if external
information is represented by a worldW , QI is any set of attributes A ⊆ Attr[W ]
such that |ReIDW (t)| = 1 for at least one tuple t on A. It can be easily seen
that this is equivalent to the notion of 1-QI of W .
Proposition 1. If a set of attributes is a k-QI, then it is an s-QI for each
s ≥ k.
Thus, we know that each 1-QI is a k-QI for k ≥ 2. It is clear that the inverse
does not hold, i.e., if k ≥ 2 there exist k-QI that are not 1-QI. For example, ZIP
in the world W of Figure 1(a) is a 2-QI, but not a 1-QI.
Definition 6. A set A of attributes is said to be a proper k-QI if it is a k-QI
but it is not an s-QI for any s < k.
The following results directly from the supertuple inclusion property of the
worlds:
Proposition 2. If a set A of attributes is a k-QI, then any A′ ⊇ A is a k-QI.
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Note that the special case of Proposition 2 for 1-QI has been independently
proved in [5].
The following sufficient condition for k-anonymity says that if the full set
of attributes appearing in external sources is a proper s-QI, then the table is
k-anonymous for each k ≤ s.
Theorem 1. A table T is k-anonymous with respect to a world W if PAttr[T ]
is a proper s-QI in W with k ≤ s.
The above theorem holds because by definition, an attribute setA ⊆ PAttr[W ]
is a proper k-QI if for each tuple t on A either |ReIDW (t)| = 0 or |ReIDW (t)| ≥
k. Hence, if PAttr[W ] is a proper s-QI we know that for each tuple t on PAttr[W ],
we have either |ReIDW (t)| = 0 or |ReIDW (t)| ≥ s. As we have always assumed
that W is consistent with T , we know |ReIDW (t)| ≥ s. For k-anonymity, it is
enough that we have s ≥ k.
By the above theorem, if the general constraints on the external world ensure
that PAttr[T ] is an s-QI with s > k, then there is no need to anonymize table
T if k-anonymity is the goal.
Now we can state the relationship between the k-anonymity notion and the
k-QI notion.
Theorem 2. A table T is k-anonymous with respect to a world W if and only if
for each k-QI A of W , with A ⊆ PAttr[T ], we have |
⋃
t′∈Dec(t) ReIDW (t
′)| ≥ k
for each tuple t ∈ piA(T ).
Proof. The “if” part: Assume there is such a k-QI A. By Proposition 2, we
know PAttr[T ] is a k-QI. By hypothesis and the definition of k-anonymity, we
know T is k-anonymous. If there is no such k-QI, then PAttr[T ] must be a
proper s-QI with s > k. In this case, by Theorem 1, T is k-anonymous.
The “only if” part: Assume T is k-anonymous. By the assumption of that
T is properly formed, k-anonymity of T leads to |
⋃
t′∈Dec(t)ReIDW (t
′)| ≥ k
for each tuple t ∈ piPAttr[T ](T ). By the supertuple inclusion property of the
world W , we know |
⋃
t′∈Dec(t) ReIDW (t
′)| ≥ k for each tuple t ∈ piA(T ) and
each attribute set A ⊆ PAttr[T ] (and hence for each A ⊆ PAttr[T ] that is a
k-QI).
From the results of this section, we may have the following observations and
conclusions. Given a table T , if any subset A of PAttr[T ] is a k-QI, then PAttr[T ]
itself is k-QI. Hence, we need to make sure that the values on PAttr[T ], not just
a proper subset of PAttr[T ], are general enough to gain k-anonymity. On the
other hand, if we have values on PAttr[T ] general enough to have k-anonymity,
then the values on any proper subset of PAttr[T ] will also be general enough
due to the supertuple inclusion property. Therefore, for k-anonymization, we
should only be concerned with the attribute set PAttr[T ], not any proper subset
of it. In the next section, we shall show, in fact, limiting the consideration to
any or all proper subsets of PAttr[T ] will lead to privacy leaking.
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5 Incorrect uses of QI in k-anonymization
As mentioned in the introduction, k-anonymity in a published table can be
obtained by generalizing the values of QI in the table. This process is called
k-anonymization. As mentioned in the introduction, at least four different uses
of QI in k-anonymization have appeared in the literature. In this section, we
point out the incorrectness of cases (2)–(4). We defer the study of case (1) to
the next section.
5.1 Use 1-QI only
Firstly, we note that the use of 1-QI (e.g., the QI as defined in [11] and [6])
instead of k-QI in the definition of k-anonymity can lead to incorrect results.
Indeed, accordingly to the current anonymization techniques, if an attribute
is not in any QI, then the attribute is not considered for k-anonymity or k-
anonymization (see Def. 2.2 in [6]).
However, if QI is taken as 1-QI as done in [11, 6], it is a mistake.
Consider the table T in Figure 1(b) for 3-anonymity. The public attribute
of T is ZIP only, which is not a QI (or 1-QI). If we only consider 1-QI for
table T , then we may incorrectly conclude that the table does not need any
generalization (on ZIP values) in order to protect privacy. However, we know
T is not 3-anonymous (but is 2-anonymous) against W in the same figure. In
order to achieve 3-anonymity, we will need to generalize the ZIP values in T .
Therefore, the k-anonymity requirements based only on 1-QI fail to protect
the anonymity of data when k ≥ 2. We can correct this problem by considering
all k-QIs, not just 1-QIs.
5.2 Use a subset of PAttr[T ]
The public attributes of a table is given by PAttr[T ]. A few papers seem to imply
that only a subset of PAttr[T ] needs to be considered. For example, [5, 4] define
QI as the minimum subset of PAttr[T ] that can be used to identify individuals,
and [12] proposes to generalize all such minimum QIs. Even if we take QI as k-
QI, the use of the minimum subset is incorrect. We have the following important
result.
Theorem 3. Given an arbitrary T , an integer k ≥ 2, and a world W , the fact
that piB(T ) is k-anonymous for each proper subset B of PAttr[T ] does not imply
that T is k-anonymous.
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that there exist a table T and a world
W , accompanied by the decoding function Dec(), with Attr[W ] = PAttr[T ] ∪
{ID}, such that T is not k-anonymous in W but each projection on a proper
subset of PAttr[T ] is k-anonymous in W . Furthermore, in this world W , each
subset A of Attr[W ] is a 1-QI.
Let PAttr[T ]= A1, . . . , An and Attr[W ] = PAttr[T ] ∪ {ID}. For each i =
1, . . . , n, let Dom(Ai) = {ai1, . . . , aik}. Now let T = Dom(A1)×· · ·×Dom(An).
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The number of tuples in T is kn, and assume we give each tuple a unique ID
value from the set {1, . . . , kn}. For each tuple (a1,i1 , . . . , an,in) with tuple ID
r, we generate the tuple (a1,i1,r, an,in,r, r) for W and let W consists of all such
tuples (and thus it has kn tuples). We assume that the decoding function works
as follows: Dec(aj,i) = {aj,i,r|r = 1, . . . , k
n}.
It is clear that in W as constructed above, each subset of Attr[W ] is a 1-QI
since each value only appears once. We now show that T is not k-anonymous
while piV (T ) is k-anonymous for each proper subset V of PAttr[T ], and thus
proving the proposition.
We first show that T is not k-anonymous. Pick an arbitrary t = (a1,i1 , . . . , an,in)
in T , and assume its ID is r. Then (a1,i1,r, . . . , an,in,r) appears in piPAttr[T ](W ).
By construction ofW , there are no other tuples of the form (a1,i1,r′ , . . . , an,in,r′)
in W with r′ 6= r. Hence, T is not k-anonymous.
Now consider a proper subset B of PAttr[T ] with B = A1, . . . , Ap and
p < n . Note that this represents an arbitrary subset due to the symmetry of
the attributes in T . Take a tuple t = (a1,i1 , . . . , ap,ip) ∈ piB(T ). Because of
the construction of W , we have (a1,i1,r, . . . , ap,ip,r) in piB(W ) for k
n−p different
r values since t appears in kn−p number of tuples in T . It follows piB(T ) is
k-anonymous since n > p and (a1,i1,r, . . . , ap,ip,r) is in Dec(t) for k
n−p different
r values.
By Theorem 3, we understand that we cannot simply apply generalization
techniques on a proper subset of attributes of PAttr[T ]. As an example, consider
table T and its generalized version T ′ in Figure 2. Attribute ID is a 1-QI, while
ZIP is not a 1-QI (however the combination of ID and ZIP is). To generalize
the minimum 1-QI, we would probably generalize table T to T ′ to make sure
there are two appearance for each (generalized) ID value. However, it is clear
that T ′ does not provide 2-anonymity in the world W given in the same figure.
ID Name ZIP
Id1 John 20033
Id2 Jeanne 20034
Id3 Jane 20033
Id4 Jane 20034
(a) The world W .
ID ZIP Disease
Id1 20033 D1
Id2 20034 D2
Id3 20033 D3
Id4 20034 D4
(b) Original table T .
ID ZIP Disease
[Id1–Id2] 20033 D1
[Id1–Id2] 20034 D2
[Id3–Id4] 20033 D3
[Id3–Id4] 20034 D4
(c) T ′ with generalized ID values.
Figure 2: Example without proper generalization
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6 Conservativeness of previous approaches
In practical scenarios, we do not know exactly what the world W is. In such
scenarios, we may want to define k-anonymity referring to all “possible” worlds,
to guarantee “conservative” k-anonymity. Indeed, this is the view taken by
[10] and other researchers. In this subsection, we provide a formal correctness
proof of a common practice of guaranteeing “conservative” k-anonymity. (Here,
“conservative” means “we would rather err on over protection”.)
The common practice we refer to is the following. Given a relational table T ,
assume each tuple contains information about a single, different individual. And
assume that the public attributes that can be used to identify the individuals
in T are PAttr[T ]. Then T is k-anonymous if for each tuple t in T , the value
t[PAttr[T ]] appears in at least k tuples in T . (Note that in the literature, the
attributes PAttr[T ] above is replaced with the “QI attributes”, which would be
a mistake if “QI attributes” do not mean PAttr[T ] as shown in the previous
section.)
In contrast to the definition of k-anonymity of this short note, with this
common practice, no external world is mentioned. We shall show below that,
in fact, this common practice provides k-anonymity in a rather “conservative”
sense with respect to all “possible” worlds.
We observe that, in contrast to what we have so far, the table T in the
common practice has an additional assumption that each tuple of T is for a
different individual. Therefore, the requirement of a consistent world for such a
table need to be upgraded. Earlier, we only needed a consistent world to be able
to re-identify each tuple in piPAttr[T ](T ) with at least one individual. Here, since
each tuple of T is assumed to be for a different individual, a consistent world
must be able to re-identify each tuple in piPAttr[T ](T ) with a different individual.
Definition 7. A world W is said to be individualized consistent with a table T
with n tuples if there exist n individuals i1, . . . , in such that there exists T
′ =
t′1, . . . , t
′
n in Dec(T ) satisfying the condition that ij is in ReIDW (piPAttr[T ](t
′
j))
for each j = 1, . . . , n.
Intuitively, this means that T could be generalized from a table T ′ such that
each tuple may be used to re-identify a different individual by W .
The fact that a worldW is individualized consistent with a table T basically
confirms the assumption that each tuple of T can indeed re-identify a different
individual. All other worlds are going to be “impossible” for table T since the
assumption that a different tuple T is for a different individual cannot hold with
such worlds. We can now capture the notion of conservative anonymity for such
tables.
Definition 8. A table T is said to be conservatively k-anonymous if it is k-
anonymous with respect to each W that is individualized consistent with T .
We use the term “conservative” also to indicate the fact that we do not use
any knowledge of the world, even if we have any, when k-anonymity is consid-
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ered. In the “practical consideration” part of Section 3, we had an example
where knowledge of the world may be used.
We are now ready to show that the common practice described earlier is
correct, if PAttr[T ] is taken as QI for a given table T .
Theorem 4. Let T be a table such that there exists a world that is individualized
consistent with T . Then T is conservatively k-anonymous if for each tuple t in
T , there exist at least k−1 other tuples t1, . . . , tk−1 in T such that ti[PAttr[T ]] =
t[PAttr[T ]] for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Proof. Let W be a world that is consistent with T , and t a tuple in T . By
hypothesis, there exist k tuples t1, . . . , tk in T (may include t itself) such that
tj [PAttr[T ]] = t[PAttr[T ]], j = 1, . . . , k. By definition of W , there exist k
individuals i1, . . . , ik such that ij is in ReIDW (t
′
j), where t
′
j is in Dec(tj), for
j = 1, . . . , k. Thus, |
⋃
t′∈Dec(t) ReIDW (t
′)| ≥ |ReIDW (t′1)∪· · ·∪ReIDW (t
′
k)| ≥
k. Hence, T is k-anonymous wrt W .
Theorem 4 shows that in general, if PAttr[T ] is taken as the QI, the common
(conservative) process of anonymization appeared in the literature is sufficient
under the assumption that we have no knowledge of the world.
The inverse of Theorem 4 does not hold. Indeed, consider T ′ in Figure 1(c).
If the Dec() function is such that Dec(J∗) = {Jane} and Dec(Jane) = {Jane},
then it is clear that T ′ is 3-anonymous with respect to all worlds that are
consistent with T ′ because in any of these worlds, there must be at least 3
individuals with the first name Jane. However, in T ′ we do not have three
tuples with the same First name attribute values.
The above example may be dismissed as using a strange decoding function.
However, for any Dec(), we can always construct a table T such that the inverse
of Theorem 4 does not hold. Formally,
Theorem 5. For any decoding function, the inverse of Theorem 4 does not
hold.
Proof. We only sketch the idea of constructing a counterexample table T for
the inverse of Theorem 4. First obtain an arbitrary tuple t in T of an arbi-
trary schema such that PAttr[T ] 6= ∅. We can make such a tuple t to satisfy
the conditions |Dec(t[PAttr[T ]])| > 1 and t[PAttr[T ]] is not in Dec(t[PAttr[T ]])
(otherwise, there is no real generalization going on). Now for each (and ev-
ery) tuple t′ in Dec(t[PAttr[T ]]), we generate a tuple t′′ for table T such that
t′′[PAttr[T ]] = t′[PAttr[T ]]. We duplicate this t′′ in T for k times. Since we
assumed t[PAttr[T ]] is not in Dec(t[PAttr[T ]]), we know that the condition of
Theorem 4 is not satisfied for t. However, for any world W that is consistent
with T , there will be at least k individuals in ReIDW (t[PAttr[T ]]). This is be-
cause there must be Dec(t′) = {t′} for each t′ given above, and in this world
W , |ReIDW (t′)| ≥ k for each t′ in Dec(t[PAttr[T ]]) by definition of consistent
worlds and the fact that t′ appears k times in piPAttr[T ](T ). Hence, tuple t
satisfies the k-anonymity condition, although t[PAttr[T ]] only appears once in
T .
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In Theorem 3, we showed that k-anonymization of any or all proper subsets
of PAttr[T ] is no guarantee in obtaining k-anonymity in T . We may extend the
result to the conservative case.
Theorem 6. Given an arbitrary T and integer k ≥ 2, the fact that piB(T ) is
conservatively k-anonymous for each proper subset B of PAttr[T ] does not imply
that T is conservatively k-anonymous.
Proof. We can simply use the table T constructed in the proof of Theorem 3. It
is easily seen that piB(T ) is conservatively k-anonymous for each proper subset
B of {A1, . . . , An} due to Theorem 3 and the fact that each tuple t[B] appears
for at least k times (as shown in the proof of Theorem 3). To show that T is
not conservatively k-anonymous we only need to construct one world W that is
consistent with T and T is not k-anonymous with respect to W . In fact, the
same W constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 is easily seen consistent with
T , and we have shown there that T is not k-anonymous with respect to that
W .
As a final remark of this section, we note that if we do have some knowledge
about the world and the Dec() function, we can in some cases do better than
this conservative approach. For example, for table T ′ in Figure 1(c), if we know
that Dec(J∗) includes Jane, and there are more than 3 Jane’s in the world, then
T ′ is 3-anonymous for T ′. Without such assumptions, we will have to generalize
Jane to J* in order to achieve 3-anonymity. The investigation of how to take
advantage of such knowledge in anonymization is beyond the scope of this short
note.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In summary, we have formally analyzed the notion of quasi-identifier as it is
essential to understand the semantics of k-anonymity. We have shown that the
current formal definitions of QI are not satisfactory and any approach based
on these definitions may lead to re-identification (i.e., privacy leakage) as this
formally defined QI corresponds to 1-QI as defined in this paper. We also
showed the problems with other definitions of QI. We have also formally proved
the correctness of using all attributes that appear in external world as QI, and
point out precisely what conservative assumptions are made along the way.
We have provided a new formal framework for k-anonymity that, by clarify-
ing the role of quasi-identifiers, allows the designers of anonymization techniques
to prove the formal properties of their solutions. The presented framework can
also serve as the basis for generalization methods with more relaxed, or differ-
ent assumptions. Indeed, the new notion of k-anonymity enables improvements
when assumptions can be made on the external information sources, i.e., the
world W .
Note that all through this short note, we have used “individuals” as the
entities whose privacy need to be protected. Obviously, any entities whose
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privacy need to be protected can be taken as the “individuals”, and the notion
of k-anonymity and k-QI should carry over without change.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the assumption of having at most one
tuple for each individual in each relational world W can be removed (but
each W tuple is still assumed only for one individual) if we assume to have
a special attribute Rid ∈ Attr[W ] storing the unique id of the individual
for each W tuple. In this case the cardinality of different tuples should be
checked on the (set-semantics) projection on this Rid attribute. For example,
in Def. 4 the formula |
⋃
t′∈Dec(t)ReIDW (t
′)| ≥ k should be substituted with
|piRid
⋃
t′∈Dec(t) σPAttr[T ]=t′(W )| ≥ k. (Here, | | counts the number of distinct
elements in a bag.)
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